We invite you to read the opinion column by Vicente Martínez, our senior associate in the Corporate and Business Group, on the recent losses in the AFPs’ Fund E and their implications from the perspective of the fiduciary duty.
This week, the Superintendency of Pensions’ new limits on the AFPs’ derivatives investments take full effect, while disciplinary proceedings continue against the seven pension fund administrators over the losses in Fund E, which fell by 10.4% in real terms between January and September. Beyond the amount lost, the fundamental legal question is a different one: whether a strategy that complied with the limits can still violate the fiduciary duty. The answer is yes, and that changes how this case should be evaluated.
The investment framework combines legal and regulatory rules. Decree-Law 3,500 establishes the bases and ranges; the Central Bank sets the maximum limits for foreign investment; and the Investment Regime adds eligibility requirements, limits by instrument and issuer, foreign exchange hedging rules, and conditions for trading derivatives. But complying with these limits is not enough. Article 147 of DL 3,500 requires asset managers to ensure adequate returns and the safety of investments, acting exclusively in the best interests of the funds. NCG 340, dated July 2025, clarified that this duty encompasses both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty, and that a transaction that is formally permitted may still be incompatible with it.
How did the system’s most conservative fund end up so exposed to U.S. interest rates? Much of the explanation lies in the swaps in which the funds received a fixed rate and paid a variable rate, profiting if long-term U.S. rates fell. These contracts require little initial outlay, so they can generate very high interest rate sensitivity without exhausting traditional limits, which were measured by asset class rather than by the portfolio’s total risk. According to a Citigroup analysis cited by Bloomberg, exposure rose from about $10.6 million per basis point in early 2024 to nearly $131 million in April of this year. When rates rose, positions that a year ago showed a gain of US$1.4 billion ended up with a negative valuation of US$7.7 billion.
It has been said that the minimum return mechanism pushes the AFPs to behave similarly, and this is true. But the herd effect explains the behavior; it does not justify it. The fiduciary duty is individual: each pension fund manager is accountable for its own decisions, and no regulation requires it to replicate a strategy it considers risky. Furthermore, the warning signs were there. The Superintendency had been warning the pension fund managers since 2024, and the Central Bank did so in its Financial Stability Reports for the second half of 2025 and the first half of 2026.
Moving forward, the goal should be to reduce risk without triggering disorderly liquidations: a gradual reduction of positions, transactions that offset exposures, increased liquidity to meet margin calls, and an accurate measurement of aggregate exposure, including stress testing and effective oversight by the board of directors. Several of these requirements already exist on paper, such as risk policies approved by the board of directors and the investment committee, and the separation between those who take risks and those who control them. The question is whether they were actually implemented.
If a violation and compensable damages are established, the liability of each AFP and compensation for the funds may be discussed. The role of each board of directors, committee, manager, and risk officer will need to be examined separately: what information they received, what authority they had, and how they reacted to warnings. A sanction against the management company does not automatically establish the personal liability of its directors. And although NCG 340 has been in effect since July 2025, it did not create the fiduciary duty; rather, it specified it. For prior decisions, Article 147 applies, which already required acting exclusively in the best interests of the funds.
This case will likely be the first serious test of the standard established by NCG 340. Its outcome will define how boards of directors and investment committees must document and monitor their decisions—and not just at the AFPs.
Column written by:
Vicente Martínez | Corporate and Business Group Senior Associate | vmartinezw@az.cl




